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Abstract—With the advent of online social media, phishers
have started using social networks like Twitter, Facebook, and
Foursquare to spread phishing scams. Twitter is an immensely
popular micro-blogging network where people post short mes-
sages of 140 characters called tweets. It has over 100 million
active users who post about 200 million tweets everyday. Phishers
have started using Twitter as a medium to spread phishing
because of this vast information dissemination. Further, it is
difficult to detect phishing on Twitter unlike emails because of
the quick spread of phishing links in the network, short size of
the content, and use of URL obfuscation to shorten the URL. Our
technique, PhishAri, detects phishing on Twitter in realtime. We
use Twitter specific features along with URL features to detect
whether a tweet posted with a URL is phishing or not. Some
of the Twitter specific features we use are tweet content and its
characteristics like length, hashtags, and mentions. Other Twitter
features used are the characteristics of the Twitter user posting
the tweet such as age of the account, number of tweets, and the
follower-followee ratio. These twitter specific features coupled
with URL based features prove to be a strong mechanism to
detect phishing tweets. We use machine learning classification
techniques and detect phishing tweets with an accuracy of
92.52%. We have deployed our system for end-users by providing
an easy to use Chrome browser extension. The extension works
in realtime and classifies a tweet as phishing or safe. In this
research, we show that we are able to detect phishing tweets
at zero hour with high accuracy which is much faster than
public blacklists and as well as Twitter’s own defense mechanism
to detect malicious content. We also performed a quick user
evaluation of PhishAri in a laboratory study to evaluate the
usability and effectiveness of PhishAri and showed that users
like and find it convenient to use PhishAri in real-world. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first realtime, comprehensive
and usable system to detect phishing on Twitter.
I. INTRODUCTION
Phishing is an online fraudulent technique used to acquire
personal and confidential credentials. Phishing attacks lead to
theft of sensitive information such as e-commerce accounts,
confidential bank account details and other personally iden-
tifiable information of an Internet user. Such attacks have
disastrous consequences as they result in identity theft and
often result in huge monetary loss [1]. It is estimated that
$520 million were lost worldwide from phishing attacks in
2011 alone. 1 Traditionally, phishing attacks target email users,
however, with the unprecedented explosion in popularity of
1http://www.rsa.com/solutions/consumer authentication/intelreport/11541
Online Fraud report 1011.pdf
Online Social Media (OSM) like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube
and Foursquare, adversaries also use these media to spam
and phish. In 2010, 43% of all the OSM users were targets
of phishing attacks. 2 In 2012, around 20% of all phishing
attacks targeted Facebook. 3 Another report in 2012 suggests
that social network phishing has jumped 221% to 9,974
attacks during Q1 of 2012 when compared to such phishing
instances in the previous quarter. 4 There has been an increase
in phishing attacks through social media due to ease and
spread of information on social networks. Multiple instances of
phishing attacks have been reported on Facebook 5, Twitter 6
and other OSMs [2]. Such a rise in phishing attacks on social
media presents a dire need for technological solutions to
deter these attacks and protect users from phishing scams.
Detecting phishing on social media is a challenge because
of (i) large volume of data – social media allow users to
easily share their opinions and interests which results into
large volumes of data and hence, make it difficult to mine
and analyze; (ii) limited space – social media often impose
character limitation (such as Twitter’s 140 character limit) on
the content due to which users use shorthand notations. Such
shorthand notation is difficult to parse since the text is usually
not well-formed; (iii) fast change – content on social media
changes very rapidly making phishing detection difficult; and
(iv) Shortened URLs – researchers have observed that more
than half of the phishing URLs are shortened to obfuscate
the target URL and to hide malignant intentions rather than
to gain character space [2]. Short URLs not only hide the
target URL but also help in evading blacklists. Twitter is an
online social networking website which allows its users to,
among other things, micro-blog their daily activity and talk
about their interests by posting short 140 character messages
called tweets. Twitter is immensely popular with more than
100 million active users who post about 200 million tweets
everyday. 7 Ease of information dissemination on Twitter and
2http://www.infographicsarchive.com/social-media/the-dark-side-of-
social-media-how-phishing-hooks-users/
3http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792234/Spam report May
2012
4https://www.markmonitor.com/mmblog/q1-2012-fraud-intelligence-
report/
5http://www.barracudalabs.com/wordpress/index.php/2012/04/06/warning-
new-facebook-phishing-via-facebook-chat-and-note/
6http://mashable.com/2011/10/26/warning-twitter-spam/
7http://blog.twitter.com/2011/09/one-hundred-million-voices.html
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2a large audience, makes it a popular medium to spread external
content like articles, videos, and photographs by embedding
URLs in tweets. However, these URLs may link to low quality
content like malware, phishing websites or spam websites.
Recent statistics show that on an average, 8% tweets contain
spam and other malicious content [3]. Figure 1 shows an
example of a malicious phishing tweet.
Fig. 1. An example of a phishing tweet. The URL which appears in the
tweet redirects the user to a fake Twitter login page.
In our research, we propose PhishAri 8 – a tool to automati-
cally detect phishing tweets in realtime. PhishAri uses various
features such as the properties of the suspicious URL, content
of the tweet, attributes of the Twitter user posting the tweet and
details about the phishing domains to effectively detect phish-
ing tweets. PhishAri decides whether a tweet is “phishing”
or “safe” by employing machine learning techniques using
a combination of the aforementioned features. Also, we have
built a Chrome browser extension to provide realtime phishing
detection to Twitter users. The browser extension protects the
user from falling prey to phishing attacks by appending a red
indicator to phishing tweets. Further, PhishAri is time efficient,
taking an average of only 0.425 (more details later in the
paper) seconds to detect phishing tweets with high accuracy
of 92.52%. Such low computation times make it ideal for real
world use.
Our major contributions of this research work are:
• Automatic realtime phishing detection mechanism for
Twitter: There have been studies on phishing detection
in emails and spam detection on Twitter, but, to the best
of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive focused
study on realtime detection (with a focus on building
usable system) of phishing on Twitter.
• More efficient than plain blacklisting method: Our tech-
nique proves to be better than plain blacklist lookup
which is the most common technique used for phishing
detection.
• Better than Twitter’s own phishing detection mechanism:
Twitter has its own phishing and malware detection
mechanism but it is often thwarted by the use of URL
shorteners and multiple redirections. PhishAri is able to
detect more phishing tweets than Twitter’s own detection
mechanism.
• Real-world implementation of the system: To the best
of our knowledge, PhishAri browser extension and API
are the first ever deployed systems for phishing detection
8‘Ari’ in Sanskrit means Enemy, since we were building a tool to curb
phishing, our system is christened PhishAri.
which can be (are being) used by real world Twitter users.
PhishAri browser extension is freely available on Chrome
Web Store for download. 9
In this study, since our goal was to detect Phishing on
Twitter and also build end-user solution for Twitter users
which works in realtime, we divide our study into two parts.
In the first part, we collected true positive data (described in
Section III) and identified features (described in Section IV)
which can be used to detect phishing tweets. Based on
these features we used various machine learning classification
techniques to classify tweets as phishing or safe. More details
of the classification experiment are described in Section VI.
We evaluated the performance of various machine learning
classification methods and found the classification algorithm
which works best for phishing detection on Twitter. We present
these detailed results in Section VII. In the second part of the
study, we used the results from the first part to create a realtime
usable system. We built a supporting HTTP POST API and a
user-friendly Chrome extension (explained in Section V) to
detect phishing on Twitter. The API and the Chrome extension
enable Twitter users to use our system and get notification
about the status of a tweet as ‘phishing’ or ‘safe’ in realtime.
With the help of a lab study described in Section VIII, we
also show that Twitter users find it convenient to use PhishAri
Chrome extension.
We describe some of the most related work on detection of
phishing in Section II. We used results, and other observations
to have an in-depth discussion which is described in Sec-
tion IX, followed by some suggested future work in Section X.
We end the paper with a conclusive summary of the work
described in Section XI.
II. RELATED WORK
Phishing is an online fraudulent technique to acquire per-
sonal and confidential credentials of Internet users [1]. Adver-
saries use phishing for various malicious activities like stealing
login credentials of bank accounts, e-commerce accounts and
other sensitive information of an Internet user. This section
gives an overview of studies which describe how and why
phishing attacks are successful and techniques used to detect
phishing scams.
A. Detection of Phishing Emails and Websites
Traditionally, phishing attacks target email users. Usually,
such emails are sent through fake SMTP messages [4] or
by impersonating the sending authority [5], [6]. There are
powerful email spam filters which effectively filter out spam
and phishing emails [4], [7]. Fette et al. used machine learning
technique to classify an email as phishing or not by using
features such as age of URL, number of dots in URL and
HTML content of email while obtaining a high accuracy of
99.5% [7].
Other techniques have also been extensively used to detect
phishing websites. Justin et al. use lexical and host-based
9https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/
pheokmlohglcpigbnbenbimcombeoolm
3features of the URLs to detect malicious webpages. How-
ever, since spammers keep changing their attacking strategy,
only the URL features can be difficult to detect malicious
URLs [8]. Zhang et al. proposed CANTINA, an approach
to detect phishing websites by examining the content of the
website. CANTINA tries to find out whether the website
has been indexed by popular search engines (e.g. Google)
or not, which is considered as a measure of a legitimate
website [9]. CANTINA analyzes the content of the website,
identifying among other heuristics, the top five terms with
highest tf-idf which are then used to determine if the website is
phishing or not by feeding them to a search engine. Whereas,
Phishari uses url, tweet, WHOIS and twitter based features
(and does not analyze the content of the website) in making
making the classification decision. CANTINA+ is another
technique proposed by Xiang et al. which extracts features
of a website like URL properties, webpage properties and
then uses machine learning technique to classify the websites
as phishing or legitimate [10]. Blacklist is another popular
method in which a record of phishing websites on the Internet
is maintained. These blacklists (like APWG blacklist and
Google Safebrowsing) are used by many web-based toolbars
and web browsers as an early warning mechanism to stop users
from visiting the malicious websites. However, blacklisting
technique is ineffective as most blacklists catch less than 20%
phishing websites at zero-hour [11]. Other methodologies to
deter phishing by spreading awareness amongst Internet users
have also been developed, which include games [12] and
educational technologies [13].
B. Phishing and spamming on Online Social Media
With the unprecedented explosion in popularity of Online
Social Media (OSM) like Facebook [14], Twitter [15] and
Youtube [16], adversaries have started using these media to
spread spam and phishing scams. In 2010, 1% of the total
Facebook users have been victims of phishing attacks, which
amounts to 5 million Facebook users. 10 Further, Twitter
receives a high spam URL clickthrough rate of 0.13%, which
is much more than that of email spam [3] as spammers
take advantage of the trust network of the social media user.
The ease of sharing information on OSM and the larger
reach to Internet users makes it a vulnerable target to spread
scams [17].
Spam detection studies on Twitter usually involve machine
learning classification techniques. These studies highlight im-
portant twitter specific features used for spam detection, such
as follower-followee ratio, tweet count and age of account.
These features can be used to detect spam tweets [18], [19] and
spammer [16] with high accuracy. The use of URL shorteners
on Twitter to share links makes automatic detection an even
more arduous task [2], [20]. There have also been studies to
understand the social network of criminals and spammers on
Twitter. Chao et al. found that criminal accounts are socially
connected and form a small closed network [21]. However,
very little research work has been done on phishing detection
10www.antiphishing.org/reports/apwg report Q1 2010.pdf
on Twitter or other OSMs, and in particular, on realtime
detection.
C. Real Time Detection
Phishing is a harmful form of spam. Phishing attacks not
only cause the leakage of personal information but also results
in huge monetary loss. Hence it is important to build effective
realtime phishing detection mechanisms for every OSM to
protect its users. There exist browser based toolbars to detect
phishing websites [22], but these toolbars require the user
to click on suspected and possibly malicious URL. Thomas
et al. proposed Monarch, a realtime malware and phishing
detection system which crawls URLs submitted to a web
service and assesses them in realtime to classify them as spam
or legitimate [23]. Monarch relies on features of the landing
page which sometime may not be available. However, these
solutions are not specific to Twitter. We believe that phishing
detection in Twitter hosts a wide range of challenges specific
to Twitter itself such as quick spread of information and the
limitation of 140 characters in tweets. A dedicated solution
proposed exclusively for Twitter by Lee et al. is the Warning-
Bird system which does not focus on detecting phishing but
on suspicious URLs in general [24]. It uses correlated redirect
chains of URLs on Twitter to detect phishing URLs. However,
WarningBird may fail if the spammers use short redirect chain
or multiple page-level redirects. Though WarningBird finds
suspicious URLs on Twitter in realtime, unlike PhishAri, it
does not provide an end-user mechanism for users to use and
protect themselves from malicious URLs.
D. Real Time Phishing Detection on Twitter
After reviewing the above techniques, it was evident that
there was very little work done to detect phishing on Twitter in
realtime. To fill this gap, we designed and developed PhishAri;
it leverages the power of blacklisting as well as other Twitter
based, URL based and WHOIS based features. Apart from
a robust API which performs realtime phishing detection, we
also developed a browser-based extension to protect users from
phishing attacks.
III. DATA COLLECTION AND LABELED DATASET
In this section, we describe how we collected data for
analysis and to build a true positive dataset of phishing tweets
containing phishing URLs for our study. Data collection in-
volves two steps as shown in Figure 2, (i) collecting data from
Twitter, (ii) labeling the tweets as phishing or legitimate. 11
A. Crawling Twitter
For our study, we required only tweets containing URLs. We
used the Twitter Streaming API 12 and the “Filter” function
provided by the API to collect such tweets. As the Twitter
Streaming API is rate limited, we can collect only a limited
number of tweets per hour. In total, we collected 309,321 such
tweets from 1 February 2012 to 19 April 2012.
11We use ‘legitimate’ and ‘safe’ interchangeably.
12https://dev.twitter.com/docs/streaming-apis/streams/public
4Fig. 2. Architecture for data collection. We collected tweets with URLs from
Twitter stream and compared the URLs against phishing blacklists to build a
true positive dataset.
B. Labeling Tweets as Phishing or Legitimate
To initially label tweets as phishing or legitimate in or-
der to create an annotated dataset, we used two blacklists,
PhishTank and Google Safebrowsing. For URL in every tweet,
we queried both PhishTank and Google Safebrowsing APIs.
PhishTank 13 is a public crowdsourced database of phishing
URLs. The suspicious URLs are submitted in the PhishTank
database by contributors and marked as phishing or legitimate
by volunteers. The PhishTank API accepts an HTTP POST
request along with the query URL, and returns a JSON object
in response which tells whether the query URL is phishing
or not. Google Safebrowsing 14 is a database of malware
and phishing links maintained by Google Inc. The Google
Safebrowsing API uses an HTTP POST request to query the
URL and matches the hash of the URL in its database of
phishing and malware URL hashes. The response from the API
is a JSON string describing whether the URL is “phishing,”
“malware” or “safe.” In case the URL in a tweet is phishing
according to PhishTank or Google Safebrowsing API, we mark
the Tweet as “phishing.” However, the inherent problem of
blacklists is that they are slow to capture malicious URLs [11].
We observed that the phishing URLs did not get caught by
blacklists on the same day they were posted on Twitter. Even
after one day very small number of URLs were detected as
phishing. Therefore, we waited for 3 days and checked all
the URLs in the tweets we had collected 3 days earlier. We
then repeated the same process for entire period of the data
collection to build the true positive dataset of phishing tweets.
Apart from using PhishTank and Google Safebrowsing
API, we also mark tweets as “phishing” which are declared
‘phishing’ by Twitter itself. Twitter opens a warning page
when one clicks a malicious URL. Also, many URLs posted on
Twitter are shortened using Bitly URL shortening service and
have the domain name “http://bit.ly/.” Bitly uses blacklisting
services from various resources and also throws a warning
page if it detects a phishing URL. We mark any such URL
as “phishing”. Those tweets which do not have any phishing
13http://www.phishtank.com/
14https://developers.google.com/safe-browsing/
URL using this technique are marked as “safe”. After applying
the above technique to 309,321 tweets, we obtained 1,589
phishing tweets (with 903 unique URLs) in our labeled dataset.
IV. FEATURE SELECTION FOR PHISHING DETECTION
Phishing detection on emails has been studied in the past
which shows that phishing websites can be detected using
a thorough analysis of the URL and the website content.
However, it has been observed that phishers constantly keep
changing the techniques they use for phishing, making de-
tection more difficult. Therefore, in this study we combine
a variety of features to provide a more robust, water-tight
and efficient detection methodology. This section explains the
various features we identify for phishing detection on Twitter.
Table I gives a list of all features which we used for our
analysis.
A. URL based Features
URL features are based on the analysis of the URL of the
suspicious website. The length of the URL, number of dots
and subdomains, and the length of the domain are some of
the most significant features that aid in phishing detection.
In phishing websites, the length of the URL tends to be
much longer than legitimate websites. However, the phishing
domains (without TLD portion) are shorter than the regular
domains. Also, phishing URLs often contain more number
of dots and subdomains than legitimate URLs [7]. We also
observe that many phishing URLs (using “robots.txt”) auto-
matically redirect bots (not browsers) to a legitimate domain
instead of redirecting to the original phishing domain. This is
one of the most effective techniques used by phishers to evade
bot-based automatic detection systems. We add such behaviour
also as a feature in phishing detection. We also use number of
redirections as one of the features since malicious URLs often
have multiple URL redirects to escape detection by blacklists.
B. WHOIS based Features
WHOIS is a query and response protocol which provides in-
formation such as ownership details, dates of domain creation
/ updation of the queried URL. We can identify tweets con-
taining phishing URLs by identifying WHOIS based features
that are common to phishing links. Most phishing campaigns
register domains of websites from the same registrar, hence
tracking the registrar may aid in detecting phishing. Further,
most phishing urls are bought for a short period of one year
as offenders need to keep constantly changing the url domain
names to evade blacklists. Also, the phishing domains are
usually created / updated just before they are tweeted. Thus,
phishing links generally have low time interval between the
domain creation / updation date and the tweet creation date.
Therefore, we use WHOIS based features such as registrar’s
name, ownership period, time interval between domain cre-
ation / updation and tweet creation date to further enhance
our phishing detection methodology.
5TABLE I
FEATURES USED IN PHISHARI. CLASSIFIED INTO URL BASED, TWEET BASED, NETWORK BASED, AND WHOIS BASED.
URL Based (F1)
Length of URL Length of expanded URL in number of characters
Number of dots Number of dots ( . ) used
Number of subdomains Number of subdomains (marked by /) in the expanded URL
Number of Redirections Number of hops between the posted URL and the Landing page
Levenshtein distance between
redirected hops
Avg Levenshtein distance between length of redirected URLs between original & final URL
Presence of conditional redi-
rects
Whether the URL is redirected to different landing page for browser or an automated program
WHOIs Based (F2)
Registering domain name Name of the domain provider
Ownership period Age of the domain
Time taken to create Twitter
account
How much time lapsed between creation of domain and the Twitter account
Tweet Based (F3)
Number of #tags Number of topics mentioned in tweet
Number of @tags Number of Twitter users mentioned in tweet
Presence of trending #tags Number of topics mentioned which were trending at that time
Number of RTs Number of times the tweet was reposted
Length of Tweet Length of tweet in number of characters
Position of #tags Number of characters of tweets after which the #tag appears
Network Based (F4)
Number of Followers Number of Twitter users who follow this Twitter user
Number of Followees Number of Twitter users who are being followed by this Twitter user
Ratio of Followers-Followees Number of Followers / Number of Followees
Part of Lists Whether the Twitter user is part of a public list
Age of account How old the Twitter account is
Presence of description Whether the Twitter account has a profile description
Number of Tweets Number of tweets posted by the Twitter user
C. Tweet based Features
Malicious tweets are often tailored to gain more visibility
in Twittersphere. Phishers achieve high visibility by carefully
using tags in their tweets and by timing their tweets at
appropriate intervals of time. Twitter provides two kinds of
tags:
• Hashtags (#): Indicates a topic on Twitter. An example of
hashtag is #Euro2012 which signifies the Euro Cup held
in 2012. Users who post tweets about Euro Cup append
#Euro2012 in the text of their tweet.
• Mention tags (@): The @tag is used to either mention
a fellow Twitter user or reply to one of his tweets. The
tweets with @tags are displayed in the mentioned user’s
timeline. For example, a tweet with @John will appear
in John’s profile where ‘John’ is a Twitter username.
Twitter facilitates searching tweets based on topics. One
who is interested in the Euro Cup can search for #Euro2012
to obtain a list of Euro Cup related tweets posted on Twitter.
When the topics are very popular, the hashtag or topic become
a “trending” topic. Trending topics are always displayed on a
user’s Twitter homepage (depending on their settings for the
location). Thus, malicious users hijack such trending topics
by posting phishing tweets with popular trending hashtags
irrespective of their relevance to increase their reach and
visibility. Also, the @tag allows any user to direct tweets to
any other user in Twittersphere irrespective of whether they
are friends / followers. Malicious users take advantage of this
feature and direct phishing tweets to random users through the
@ tag. Thus, malicious tweets have higher number of hashtags
and @tags so that the tweet is directly visible to the mentioned
users and the users searching for a topic on Twitter using
the mentioned hashtags. Hence, we include such tweet based
features for phishing detection.
D. User Attributes and Network based Features
Friend relationships on Twitter are unidirectional and de-
scribed by the following:
• Followers of a user X are those Twitter users who
subscribe to X’s tweets. Whenever X posts a tweet, it
appears in his follower’s timeline
• Followees of a user X are those Twitter users whom X
has subscribed to. X gets all the tweets posted by his
followees in his timeline.
Studies on Twitter spam show that spammers have different
tweeting behavior when compared to legitimate users. For
example, spammers often post automated tweets in large
numbers usually at predefined intervals of time [25]. Also, it
has been observed that malicious users have a large number of
“followees” but a small number of “followers.” Thus, we use
features such as number of tweets posted, Follower-Followee
ratio and other Twitter profile information like the description
of the Twitter user and presence of profile image for phishing
detection.
V. PHISHARI API AND BROWSER EXTENSION
Our goal in this research work is to provide realtime
protection from phishing to Twitter users. To enable this, we
built a browser extension for Twitter and a supporting API to
indicate whether a tweet is phishing or not.
A. Browser Extension
A large fraction of Twitter users use web browser to
access Twitter. 15 Users are usually hesitant to change the
platforms they use. Therefore, we built a browser extension
15http://blog.twitter.com/2010/09/evolving-ecosystem.html
6which seamlessly integrates phishing detection results into
the user’s Twitter pages. The extension once installed shows
a green indicator next to tweets which are safe and a red
indicator next to phishing tweets. The detection mechanism is
designed such that it requires no extra clicks or key press. The
extension works for any tweet which appears either in a user’s
timeline, Twitter search results or tweets on the homepage of
other Twitter users. PhishAri browser extension also works for
Direct Messages (DM) of a user if the URL in the DM has
been detected as phishing by a blacklist. Figure 3 shows the
red and green indicators at the end of the URL in each of the
tweets.
The current version of PhishAri extension works for
‘Chrome’ browser and is written in Javascript. The browser
extension extracts the tweet ID 16 of a tweet and then makes
a request to the PhishAri API hosted on a separate server.
The API takes the tweet ID as input and returns back a
string indicating whether the tweet is ‘phishing’ or ‘safe.’
Accordingly, PhishAri extension displays either a red or a
green indicator in front of the tweet. This whole process is
very robust and it takes a maximum of 0.522 seconds for an
indicator to appear for a tweet. However, this time is dependent
on various factors such as the speed of feature extraction, In-
ternet bandwidth and time to query Twitter API. We elaborate
our system configuration which affects the feature extraction
and classification time. Figure 3 shows a screenshot of the
extension which is available on Chrome Web Store for free
download.
Fig. 3. PhishAri on Chrome. Currently, there are more than 70 active users
using the extension. The green indicator shows that the tweet is ‘safe’ whereas,
a red indicator appears in front of ‘phishing’ tweets.
B. PhishAri API
PhishAri API is a RESTful API written in Python using
mod wsgi 17 framework. mod wsgi framework enables the
Apache server to host a Python application. The API is hosted
on an Intel Xeon 16 core Ubuntu server with 2.67 GHz
processor and 32 GB RAM.
The API provides a POST method to submit tweets for
analysis. Once a tweet is submitted to the API, it classifies
16tweet ID is the numeric unique identifier of a tweet
17http://code.google.com/p/modwsgi/
the URL as ‘phishing’ or ‘safe’ with the help of the set
of features described in Section IV using a trained classifier
model pre-loaded on the server. Since our goal is to provide
realtime indication to Twitter user, we require the time period
for feature extraction and classification to be very less. To
facilitate this, the API has multiprocessing modules which
extract independent features simultaneously, hence saving a
large amount of time in processing. Once the classification is
done, the decision is output in form of a JSON string.
Figure 4 shows the integration of PhishAri browser exten-
sion with the PhishAri API. The extension sends a POST
request to the API with the tweet ID. Once the API gets the
tweet ID, it extracts all information about the tweet using the
features mentioned in Section IV. These features include URL
specific features, Twitter user information and details about
the Twitter network of the user. Using these features, the API
constructs a feature vector which is used for classification by
comparing the feature vector to a pre-loaded classifier model
for phishing tweet detection. Once the decision is made, the
API returns back a JSON object indicating whether the tweet
is phishing or not.
Fig. 4. Integration of PhishAri API with the browser extension. The extension
sends tweet ids and URLs to the API through a POST request. The API
responds with the results based on which the red or green indicators are
embedded to the corresponding tweets by the extension
VI. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we describe the mechanism used for clas-
sification of phishing tweets. Our aim is to detect phishing
tweets in realtime. In order to build such a mechanism, we
need to identify the correct and most efficient classification
methodology for which we setup the experiment. In this
section, we explain the experimental setup for our study.
We describe various machine learning techniques we use for
phishing tweets classification. Machine learning techniques
involve classification of an unseen data point using a classifi-
cation model built on a pre-labeled (already classified) dataset.
Hence, our experiment involves three stages. In the first stage,
to create a labelled dataset, we collect tweets with URLs and
7label these tweets as ‘phishing’ or ‘safe.’ In the second stage,
we train a classifier model using a classification algorithm.
In the third stage, whenever we obtain a tweet with URL,
we use the trained model to make a classification decision
for this newly appeared URL. Now, we describe the machine
learning algorithms we use for our study and the evaluation
metrics which indicate the quality and the accuracy of our
classification task.
A. Machine Learning Classification
To evaluate the most effective technique for phishing detec-
tion on Twitter, we investigate the use of multiple classification
algorithms. This section explains these algorithms in brief and
details on how we use them for our phishing detection task.
1) Naive Bayes: This is a probabilistic classifier and is
based on the Naive Bayes’ theorem. It works efficiently when
the dimensionality of the input feature vector is high and each
feature is independent of each other. Based on each feature,
the Naive Bayes classifier computes the likelihood of the
data point to be classified into each possible category. The
data point is then classified into the category for which the
likelihood (probability) is the highest. For this study, we use
the naivebayes module of Python NLTK classify package. 18
2) Decision Trees: This is a widely used machine learning
technique. It is based on a predictive model which creates
a classification tree. Decision tree algorithm creates a model
that predicts the category of the target data point by learning
simple decision rules inferred from the data features. We use
‘DecisionTreeClassifier’ module provided by ‘scikit’ library. 19
3) Random Forest: Random Forest is one of the most
accurate classifiers and it works efficiently for large databases.
For each data point to be classified, this technique randomly
chooses a subset of features which are used for classification.
It selects the most important features of the data point hence
improves the predictive accuracy and controls over-fitting.
We use ‘RandomForestClassifier’ module provided by ‘scikit’
library for this study.
B. Training and Testing Data
We perform a 5 fold cross-validation for computing the
classification results. The labeled dataset is partitioned into
5 subsets. In each test run, 4 subsets are used for training and
the remaining subset is used as test data. Hence, we classify
using 5 test run which ensures that each set has been used for
training as well as testing. The final classification result is the
average of results from the 5 classification runs.
VII. RESULTS
As stated earlier, our study consists of two parts. In the
first part, we develop a classification model based on various
features like URL based and Twitter based features and
classify tweets accordingly as phishing or safe. This forms
our PhishAri API which uses a trained model and classifies
incoming tweets based on the described features. In the next
18http://nltk.org/api/nltk.classify.html#module-nltk.classify.naivebayes
19http://scikit-learn.org/
step, we create an end-user solution by deploying a Chrome
extension which makes a call to the above API and public
blacklists and then marks each tweet as phishing or safe with
the help of a color-coded marker.
In this section, we elaborate the results of the first part
of our study, i.e., the results and observations based on the
classification mechanism using the four set of feature sets
described in Section IV.
A. Evaluation Metrics
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of our classification
method based on the features described, we use the stan-
dard information retrieval metrics viz. accuracy, precision and
recall. Precision of a class is the proportion of predicted
positives in that class that are actually positive. Recall of a
class is the proportion of the actual positives in that class
which are predicted positive. To explain this further, we use
the ‘confusion matrix’ described in Table II.
TABLE II
CONFUSION MATRIX FOR CLASSIFICATION.
Predicted
Phishing Safe
Actual
Phishing TP FN
Safe FP TN
Each entry in the table indicates the number of elements
of a class and how they were classified by our classifica-
tion method. For example, ‘TP’ is the number of phishing
tweets which were correctly classified as phishing. Using this
confusion matrix, we can compute the precision (Equation 1)
and recall (Equation 2) for both ‘phishing’ and ‘safe’ classes.
We also use the confusion matrix to compute the overall
‘accuracy’ (Equation 3) of the classifier. It is the ratio of the
correctly classified elements of either class to the total number
of elements.
Precisionphishing = TP/(TP + FP ) (1)
Recallphishing = TP/(TP + FN) (2)
Accuracy = (TP + TN)/(TP + FP + TN + FN) (3)
B. Classification Results
We now describe the results of our classification experiment
as described in Section VI. We use three classification methods
for our study viz. Naive Bayes, Decision Trees and Random
Forest. We present the results of classification task using all
these methods.
From the 1,589 phishing tweets, we found that 1,473 tweets
had unique text. Therefore, is our true positive dataset, we
consider these 1,473 phishing tweets and 1,500 safe tweets
chosen randomly from the tweets marked as ‘safe’ during our
data collection process. We use this dataset for the rest of our
classification experiments. Previous studies show that there
is 8% spam content on Twitter which consists of phishing,
malware and other unwanted tweets [3]. Therefore, to balance
the prediction error and minimize the overall error rate, we
8assign positive weights to spam class to account for the
unbalanced dataset. We found that Random Forest classifier
works best for phishing tweet detection on our dataset with a
high accuracy of 92.52%. We also obtain a recall of 92.21%
for phishing class and 96.82% for safe class. The results from
the three classification techniques are described in the table III.
It is observed that when we used Random Forest classifier, we
also achieved a high recall and precision for both ‘phishing’
and ‘safe’ classes. It is important in our study to achieve a
good precision of both classes to reduce the number of false
negatives and false positives. Precision-accuracy balance is
hard to achieve and we notice that the precision of phishing
class drops but accuracy increases when we move from Naive
Bayes classifier to Decision Tree classifier. However, we
finally achieved a desirable precision and accuracy when we
used Random Forest classifier. Random Forest reduces false
positives and hence the precision of both the classes increased
significantly.
TABLE III
RESULTS OF CLASSIFICATION EXPERIMENTS. WE OBSERVE THAT
RANDOM FOREST PERFORMS THE BEST WITH AN ACCURACY OF 92.52%
Evaluation metric Naive Bayes Decision Tree Random
Forest
Accuracy 87.02% 89.28% 92.52%
Precision
(phishing)
89.21% 88.05% 95.24%
Precision (safe) 92.12% 94.15% 97.23%
Recall (phishing) 68.32% 74.51% 92.21%
Recall (safe) 85.67% 89.20% 95.54%
Previous studies show that Random Forest outperforms all
classifiers for phishing email detection with an error rate of
7.72% [26]. We find that the superior performance of Random
Forest for phishing detection on Twitter also holds true with
a high accuracy. We further investigate the performance of
Random Forest classification method by using the confusion
matrix described in Table IV. We show that we could detect
92.31% phishing tweets correctly. However, we misclassified
9.6% of legitimate tweets as phishing tweets. This is because
the user behaviour of the many of the source Twitter users of
such tweets is very close to that of a phisher like - extensive
use of unrelated hashtags and automated tweet activity. The
false negative percentage is low indicating that we classified
only 7.78% phishing tweets as legitimate. The misclassifica-
tion of phishing tweets as legitimate tweets happens because
some phishing tweets exhibit similar features as legitimate
tweets. We manually observed a sample of such misclassified
tweets and found that there are Twitter accounts which often
exhibit dual behavior by sometimes posting legitimate tweets
and sometimes phishing tweets. These users are either already
compromised or due to negligence, retweet a phishing tweet.
Hence, tweets from such users are misclassified, as their
behavior and attributes are very similar to both legitimate users
and phishers. Since our classification methodology takes into
account Twitter based features, with the evolution of phishing
techniques on Twitter, if a malicious user makes the phishing
tweet look like a legitimate tweet and has Twitter network
features as that of a legitimate user, our classification method
may misjudge the phishing tweet as legitimate.
TABLE IV
PRECISION AND RECALL FOR PHISHING DETECTION USING RANDOM
FOREST BASED ON ALL FOUR FEATURE SETS.
Predicted
Phishing Safe
Actual
Phishing 92.31% 7.78%
Safe 9.60% 94.41%
C. Evaluation of various Feature Sets
Most of the previous studies to detect phishing have used
features based on the URL of the suspicious page and the
HTML source of the landing page. In this study, we propose
to use Twitter based features along with URL based features
to quickly detect phishing on Twitter at zero-hour. To evaluate
the performance of detection using these additional set of
features based on Twitter properties, we present feature-set
wise performance of the classification technique we use.
As described in Table I, we have used four sets of features
in this study. To evaluate the impact of each feature set,
we performed classification task by taking one feature set at
a time and then added the other one in the next iteration.
Table V presents our experiment results by using different
set of features using Random Forest classification method
which gives us the overall highest accuracy of 92.52%. We
observe that when we use only URL based features, we get an
overall accuracy of 82.22% and a low precision and recall for
‘phishing’ class. The addition of Twitter based feature sets,
user based features and network based features significantly
improve the performance of phishing detection and boost the
precision of identifying phishing tweets significantly. Hence,
Twitter based features are helpful in increasing the perfor-
mance of classifying phishing tweets.
D. Most Informative Features
We now evaluate the most important features which help to
decide whether a tweet is phishing or not. We use ‘scikit’
library to find out the most informative features. Random
Forests deploy ensemble learning to evaluate the feature im-
portance. After each random tree is constructed using a set of
features, its performance (misclassification rate) is calculated.
Then the values of each feature is randomly permuted (for
each feature) and the new misclassification rate is evaluated.
The best performing features are then chosen as the most
informative features. The most informative features which
we found for phishing tweet detection using Random Forest
classification are described in Table VI.
Ownership period is one of the most important features in
phishing detection. The domains of malicious and phishing
URLs tend to be short lived when compared to the domains
of legitimate URLs in order to avoid detection. Similarly the
age of Twitter account of the user posting phishing tweets is
also generally less. Such users are often detected by Twitter
and their accounts are suspended. However, using PhishAri
API, we could detect a large number of phishing tweets by
such users before they were suspended by Twitter.
Another important feature is the presence of conditional
redirects. Many phishing websites redirect the user to a
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FEATURE SET WISE PERFORMANCE OF CLASSIFICATION OF PHISHING TWEETS.
Feature Sets Precision (Phishing) Precision (Safe) Recall (Phishing) Recall (Safe) Accuracy
F1 81.27% 88.21% 79.25% 91.34% 82.22%
F1 + F2 86.11% 89.92% 85.21% 92.21% 87.31%
F1 + F2 + F3 91.10% 94.66% 88.32% 92.88% 90.03%
F1 + F2 + F3 + F4 95.24% 97.23% 92.21% 95.54% 92.52%
legitimate website instead of the phishing landing page if
the page is being accessed via an automated script or bot.
In our experiment, we compare the landing URL when the
suspected URL is accessed by the browser simulation and bot
simulation. In case the landing URLs are different, there is a
high possibility that the website is malicious. The redirection
to a legitimate website when accessed by an automated script
is to avoid detection by bots such as googlebots traversing
through the Internet.
We also find that presence of trending #tags in a tweet is
an important feature for phishing detection. Phishers often
hijack trending topics and start posting unrelated content in
their tweets with the trending #tag appended. This increases
the visibility of their tweet as trending topics specific to a
location are always displayed on the homepage of a Twitter
user.
Phishers usually have more number of followees than fol-
lowers. Since relationships on Twitter are unidirectional, a
Twitter user needs trust to be followed by another user. Since
phishers do not often post legitimate content, very few Twitter
users tend to follow phishers. However, phishers follow a lot
of users in the hope of being followed back. Hence the ratio of
Follower-Followee is very skewed in case of phishing tweets.
Another technique used by phishers to gain visibility is to
directly mention other Twitter users in their tweets. Phishers
tend to have a lot of @tags in their tweets so that their tweet
is directly visible to the mentioned users. Since the mentioned
users receive these tweets in their timeline, there is a high
chance that the target users click on the links and fall victim
to phishing attacks.
TABLE VI
MOST INFORMATIVE FEATURES FOR DETECTING PHISHING TWEETS.
Ranking Feature
1 Ownership period
2 Age of account
3 Presence of conditional redirects
4 Presence of trending #tags
5 Number of Redirections
6 Follower-Followee Ratio
7 Number of @tags
E. Comparison of PhishAri with Blacklists
The inherent problem of the blacklists is that they are slow
to catch phishing URLs. Since Twitter provides a realtime
stream of tweets to a user, it is important that the tweets
are detected as phishing as soon as they appear to the user.
Blacklists in such cases prove to be ineffective. To support
our claim, we compare the performance of PhishAri with two
public blacklists, Google Safebrowsing and PhishTank.
At the time of data collection, we collected realtime stream
of tweets from Twitter and immediately look up the URLs
present in the tweet in these blacklists. Since blacklists take
some time to add newly created phishing URLs, we wait for
3 days and again lookup the URLs collected 3 days ago in the
Google safebrowsing and PhishTank blacklists. We also use
PhishAri to classify each of these tweets as phishing or safe.
We found that 80.6% unique phishing tweets were detected
as phishing at zero-hour by PhishAri which were caught by
the blacklists only later when we checked after 3 days. Public
blacklists are often based on crowdsourcing (like PhishTank)
or use URL based or landing page based features. However,
phishers often keep changing their strategies and hence these
detection mechanisms by blacklists often fail. We couple
these features along with other features for a better phishing
detection to obtain efficient realtime detection. This shows
that PhishAri can complement the blacklisting mechanism for
Twitter to detect more phishing URLs in realtime.
F. Comparison of PhishAri with Twitter
Twitter has its own detection mechanism for catching mali-
cious, spam and phishing tweets. In case a URL in a tweet is
not safe, Twitter shows a warning page to the user when one
tries to navigate to that URL from Twitter. However, we found
that Twitter’s mechanism was not as quick and was unable to
catch a large fraction of phishing URLs appearing in tweets
in realtime.
To compare the performance of PhishAri API with Twitter’s
detection mechanism, we check whether Twitter marks a
URL as safe or not at the time it is submitted to Twitter
stream. Then, we again check the status of the URL after
3 days. Out of 3,09,321 tweets with URLs, we found that
492 tweets were undetected by Twitter at the time of data
collection, however they were marked as ‘suspicious’ URLs
only later when we checked after 3 days. However, PhishAri
was able to detect 84.6% of these phishing tweets at zero-
hour which were blacklisted by Twitter later. This shows
that PhishAri if implemented along with Twitter’s malicious
tweets detection mechanism, can help boost the performance
of realtime detection of phishing on Twitter.
G. Time Evaluation
One of the major aims of this study is realtime detection
of phishing tweets. Hence our mechanism needs to be robust
enough to quickly classify a phishing tweet. We now evaluate
how much time PhishAri takes to classify a URL. As men-
tioned before, a classifier model is preloaded on our server
which is used to make decisions about a tweet. The PhishAri
API is written using multiprocessing modules so that it can
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Fig. 5. Figure 5(a) shows the most frequent words of phishing tweets in our dataset. Figure 5(b) shows the frequent words occurring in a sample of legitimate
tweets from our dataset. Both the tagclouds have random 50 tweets. In case of phishing tweets there is a dominance of certain words which signify the spam
campaign promoted at that time, however, the legitimate tweets have almost all words occurring with equal probability.
extract independent features simultaneously, hence increasing
the speed of computation. We find that the time required for the
feature extraction and classification of a tweet is a maximum of
0.522 seconds (Min: 0.167 sec, Avg: 0.425 sec, Median 0.384
sec). This time was taken when we ran our experiments on an
Intel Xeon 16 core Ubuntu server with 2.67 GHz processor
and 32 GB RAM. However, we must note that the speed
of classification is also dependent on the response times of
the Twitter API, the WHOIS repository and also the Internet
bandwidth.
H. Characteristics of Phishing Tweets
We also found that the words used in case of phishing
tweets are different from those used in legitimate tweets.
Phishing tweets often have keywords which are specifically
used to lure the unsuspecting Twitter user into clicking the
URL. The content of the tweet is often appealing enough
and promises some kind of benefit to the user if one visits
the URL. Figure 5(a) shows the most popular words which
appear in phishing tweets. We see that ‘product,’ ‘allow,’ etc.
are the most popular words. They appear repeatedly because
of a phishing campaign which asks Twitter details in return
for more Twitter followers.
The text of phishing tweets is considerably different from
that of legitimate tweets, where people usually talk about
general topics and use a variety of words unlike phishing
tweets which use a limited set of words. Figure 5(b) shows
the word tag cloud of a sample of legitimate tweets. The
words occurring in legitimate may also depend on the trending
hashtags at the time tweets were posted. However, the text for
phishing tweets remains relatively the same for a particular
phishing campaign irrespective of the trending topic. However,
phishing tweets contain the hastags which are trending at the
time they were posted to gain visibility.
We also try to ascertain the country of the origin of phishing
tweets in our dataset. We find that USA has maximum number
of users posting phishing URLs followed by Brazil. The
geomap in Figure 6 shows the concentration of phishing URLs
originating from various countries across the world on Twitter.
Manual evaluation shows that many of the phishing accounts
were indeed from USA. However, it must be noted that the
phishers could’ve falsely selected the country as USA in their
Twitter bio page. Also, more than 25% of all Twitter users
are from USA, thus, it might seem natural that there are more
phishing tweets originating from there. 20
Fig. 6. Countries from where phishing tweets originate.
VIII. PHISHARI EXTENSION FOR CHROME BROWSER
In this section, we evaluate the realtime browser extension
we built for phishing detection. The extension works for
Chrome browser and has currently more than 70 active users.
We evaluate user experience of our extension and present
statistics about how our extension is being used by Twitter
users.
A. User Experience
There have been user studies to evaluate and assess the user-
experience of browser based tools [27]. The users of the study
are asked to use the tool and give feedback about the system.
We performed a lab study to find out the user experience with
PhishAri and whether users find the extension effective and
useful. The lab study consisted of 10 users out of which 7
20http://venturebeat.com/2012/07/30/twitter-reaches-500-million-users-
140-million-in-the-u-s/
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were males and 3 females. All users were active on Twitter.
They were given the download link of the PhishAri extension
page which also gave details about the extension and described
how it worked. Each user was asked to browse Twitter after
installing the PhisAri extension and were asked if they found
the plugin effective and easy to use. All users said that the
extension was very easy to use and the indicator displayed with
every tweet did not adversely affect their Twitter experience.
However, 4 users commented that they prefer using Twitter
clients over browser. Currently, PhishAri provides support only
for browser based Twitter access. For all 10 users, the color
coded indicators appeared as soon as the tweet loaded without
any visible delay. However, 5 users observed a time lag in the
appearance of the indicators when they were browsing tweet
stream of a trending topic on Twitter. In future, we will try
to make PhishAri faster to fill this gap. Since phishing tweets
are not abundantly present as compared to other tweets, and
we conducted a time-limited lab study, we created a dummy
Twitter account which had a mix of phishing and legitimate
tweets. Users were asked to go to the dummy Twitter account
to check if a red indicator appears for phishing tweets or not.
Two users commented that whenever there is a red indicator
for a tweet, they would like to see a preview of the landing
page (as in web-based systems likes PhishTank) when they
hover over the indicator. We think that adding this feature in
future would be useful to gain the confidence of user.
Users were asked if they would be interested to use the
PhishAri extension daily in regular use. Except the 4 users
who prefer using Twitter client over browser, all other users
said that PhishAri seems to be a useful tool. These users also
said that they would like to have a similar spam detection tool
for Twitter which indicates whether a tweet (irrespective of the
presence of a URL) is spam or legitimate. However, the scope
of PhishAri is currently to indicate whether a tweet which
has a URL is ‘phishing’ or ‘safe.’ The lab study showed that
PhishAri works with ease and is non-intrusive; the indicators
do not distract the users attention while browsing Twitter. The
color coded indicators are effective in indicating the status
of a tweet but could be improved by showing an optional
preview of the landing page when the cursor is hovered over
the indicator.
B. Statistics
We present some statistics about PhishAri browser exten-
sion. We have Google Analytics 21 enabled for our extension
which helps us track the user details like the country and the
active time of user using the extension. We found that we have
a wide diversity of users from various countries with highest
traffic from the US and India. Table VII shows the percentage
of users from various countries who use PhishAri.
IX. DISCUSSION
In this section we highlight some important aspects of
PhishAri.
21http://www.google.com/analytics
TABLE VII
PHISHARI CHROME EXTENSION USERS FROM VARIOUS COUNTRIES
ACROSS THE WORLD.
Country / Territory Users
United States 32.59%
India 28.09%
Germany 8.20%
Saudi Arabia 6.90%
United Kingdom 3.62%
Greece 3.35%
France 2.93%
Russia 2.70%
Slovakia 2.25%
Egypt 2.09%
Singapore 1.41%
Morocco 1.29%
a) Selection of features for realtime detection: There
have been studies which show that extraction of Twitter user
specific information helps in a very accurate spam detection.
Since we wanted our system to be fast, efficient and executable
in realtime, we experimented and discarded features which
included analyzing all tweets by the source user in favor
of faster system performance. We observed that Twitter user
specific features like comparison of text of all the user’s tweets
and finding features related to the Twitter friends of that user
do not increase the classification accuracy but significantly
increase the response time. Hence, we discard such features
and yet achieve an accuracy of 92.52%. Carefully chosen
important features based on URL analysis, tweet analysis and
tweet user’s analysis, help us to detect phishing with high
confidence but in a reasonable amount of time so that end
users can use our methodology in practice.
b) Parallel computation of features: To enable quick
decision on a tweet, we have multiprocessing modules in
our system which extract features in parallel. This helps in
reduction of overall computation time. However, in future, we
can further improve the feature extraction by distributing the
computation of features across multiple servers.
c) PhishAri available as API: PhishAri is available as
a RESTful API which can be called using an HTTP POST
request by passing the tweet ID as the input parameter.
We have yet not (but soon to be) released the PhishAri
API publicly, but it can be used by various applications to
decide whether a tweet is phishing or not. It can also be a
complementary technique used along with Twitter’s defense
mechanism for better protection from phishing on Twitter.
X. FUTURE WORK
Now we discuss how we can further improve PhishAri for
more efficient and robust phishing detection.
d) Backend database for faster lookup: In future, we can
maintain a cache backend database to capture tweets which
have already been marked as either phishing or safe on Twitter.
So, if a tweet with same URL appears on Twitter, then we can
skip the entire process of feature extraction and classification
and lookup in our dataset of phishing URLs and safe URLs.
This will also help us increase our own database of phishing
tweets.
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e) Increase the scope of PhishAri from public to all
tweets: Currently, PhishAri can detect whether a tweet is
phishing or not only if the source Twitter user of that tweet
is a public user. Otherwise PhishAri is unable to extract the
user specific information. In future, we will implement oauth
integration of Twitter with PhishAri so that it can detect a
wider range of phishing tweets. However, this is just a proof
of concept and does not affect our methodology in any way.
XI. CONCLUSION
In this study, we built PhishAri – an effective mechanism
to detect phishing on Twitter. Our methodology exploits not
just the traditional phishing detection features which are based
on the URL and the suspicious landing page, but also Twitter
specific and WHOIS based features. We use a combination
of URL based and Twitter based features which help in an
effective and realtime detection of phishing on Twitter. As
a proof of concept, we also develop a RESTful API which
can be accessed using an HTTP POST method. We also
implement a Chrome browser extension which makes a call to
this API and accordingly shows an indicator next to each tweet
indicating whether the tweet is phishing or not. We also show
that our methodology works faster than standard blacklisting
mechanism and Twitter’s own defense mechanism. We were
able to detect 80.6% more URLs than popular blacklists like
PhishTank and Google Safebrowsing at zero-hour with an
accuracy of 92.52%. Similarly, our detection mechanism also
works better than Twitter’s defense system by 84.6% at zero-
hour. Since we do not achieve a 100% accuracy, there is always
a possibility of false negatives. However, our method can be
coupled with blacklisting and Twitter’s defense mechanism
for a better, more accurate realtime detection of phishing on
Twitter.
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